

# **DISEC Committee Guide**

## **London International Model United Nations (LIMUN 2012)**

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## Message from the Committee Directors

Honorable delegates,

It is with great anticipation that we welcome you to London International Model United Nations 2012, and in particular the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC).



My name is Christin Weigt and I will be serving as your Director at LIMUN 2012. I am originally from Germany but have studied in the United States, Hong Kong and the UK. I am currently reading for my Masters in Conflict, Security and Development at the War Studies Department of King's College London. During my undergraduate degree at Edinburgh University I had the pleasure to pursue my interest in Model UN as a delegate, ScotMUN organiser, external conference officer, and director at numerous UK and international conferences. As your director I hope to share with you my passion for international relations, and particularly questions of security and development.



Dear Delegates,

My name is Miruna, I'm from Belgium and I study Political Science at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. International politics is one of my greatest passions, only rivaled perhaps by my curiosity for foreign cultures and love for learning new languages. I first learned of Model UN several years ago and have since then attended multiple conferences. Chairing at LIMUN this year will be my first chairing experience, and I cannot wait to get started! I look forward to meeting all of you and hearing the ideas and solutions you will bring to the negotiations table. Much luck with your preparation and see you soon!

Hello,

My name is Mirza Mohammed Ali Khan but I am known as Zahaan. I am pursuing Electrical and Electronics engineering at SRM University in Chennai, India. I started MUNs in 2010 and have done 14 MUNs until now. I have been to 6 conferences as delegate and have won them all. I have attended 7 in the capacity of president and 1 as Secretary General. All these MUNs have been national level MUNs in India. I am excited to come to the UK for my first international conference.



### **Committee Introduction**

The Disarmament and International Security Committee deals with disarmament and related international security questions. One of the fundamental aims of the United Nations (UN) is to promote International security and relative peace among nations. To this end, the UN maintains a security framework consisting of the Security Council, the Conference on Disarmament, and the First Committee of the General Assembly: Disarmament and International Security (DISEC). This committee is dedicated to the principles of international peace and Security. The powers of DISEC are restricted to those specifically enumerated By the UN charter in Chapter V. The committee is limited by the UN charter, in that it is based on the international principles of cooperation and cannot dictate action to be taken by any nation: DISEC lacks the authority to declare war or to forcibly impose its recommendations upon nations or groups. For example, the dispatch of peacekeeping forces is essentially delegated to the domain of the Security Council, while the planning of technical details concerning UN disarmament policies and their feasibility comes under the jurisdiction of the Convention on Disarmament. As a result, the final suggestions of the First Committee are communicated in the form of resolutions to the GA and Security Council. While the committee lacks the power to prescribe definite action, the broad representation of nations and equal voting structure leads to resolutions viewed with respect and credibility, as they represent a genuine agreement among states and are more likely to result in the desired action.

## **Topic A:**

### **The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East after the Arab Spring**

*“We resolve therefore to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.”*

UN Millennium Declaration, Section II, Par. 9, §9 – UNGA, 8/09/2000

The members of the United Nations have long sought to limit the spread and effects of nuclear weapons. While the only instance of actual use of such weapons was the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States during World War II, the threat of their use has been felt by the entire international community ever since the creation of the very first bomb.

The first international treaties limiting the production, use and spread of nuclear armament were agreed upon as a result of a weapon's race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In the 1960s the two states came close to nuclear war. In 1963 then, the US, USSR and the UK signed the **Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)**, a treaty banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. In 1996 the UNGA adopted the **Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)**, expanding the provisions of the PTBT by adding a ban on underground nuclear weapon testing. Since then 182 states have signed this treaty and it has been ratified by 159 states, except the US and China.

Following the PTBT, the **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)** was also introduced, aiming at limiting the spread and development of nuclear weapons in the world. This treaty is currently signed by 190 states and is thus the most comprehensive binding document on the topic. However, the threat of a nuclear war still exists, with states such as India and Pakistan, both in possession of nuclear warheads, not being signatories to any of these treaties.

## **DISEC:**

The first topic proposed for our DISEC simulation addresses the threat posed by nuclear weapons in combination with the current security concerns for the Middle East. As the Arab world marks one year since the beginning of the people's uprisings that spread throughout the north of Africa and parts of the Middle East, a phenomenon widely known as the 'Arab Spring', this committee will strive to achieve a comprehensive analysis and a viable solution to the issue of nuclear proliferation in the region. In the light of great regional instability and conflict, the possible buildup of a nuclear arsenal

by several states competing for regional influence and prestige is a very real threat, and one of great concern for the entire international community. Indeed, the risk of nuclear proliferation has been amplified by the current situation on the ground in the region and it is of utmost importance that measures be taken to avoid an all-out arms race that would endanger the world.

While the nature of DISEC does not allow it to take any decisive action, it can and must act as a medium for negotiation and discussion between all parties concerned, striving to achieve an understanding acceptable to all.

The danger for nuclear proliferation in the region stems from the following core issues: all Middle Eastern states are party to the NPT, except for Israel, which not only refuses to join the NPT and submit to IAEA inspections, but is also widely considered a *de facto* nuclear weapon state. Israel's use of weapons is cause of concern for neighboring Iran and Syria, allegedly leading the two states to develop their own covert nuclear weapons programmes. IAEA reports have repeatedly condemned the existence of secret nuclear sites in both Iran and Syria and the matter has been referred to the UNSC for analysis and action. However, even after four rounds of sanctions imposed on Iran by the Security Council, little has changed up to the present day.

The main regional actors are:

**ISRAEL.** The fact that Israel remains the only Middle Eastern state yet to have signed the NPT is a great setback in the Middle Eastern peace process. Israel is considered a *de facto* nuclear weapon state. While there is no official confirmation of the existence of an Israeli nuclear arsenal, reliable sources estimate that the state possesses between 100-200 nuclear warheads, making it the world's 5<sup>th</sup>, perhaps even 4<sup>th</sup>, largest nuclear power ahead of Britain and France<sup>1</sup>. Israel's refusal to sign the NPT and allow IAEA inspections in their nuclear facilities fuels the conflict with its neighbors and makes achieving lasting peace in the region an impossible task.(A/RES/64/66, 65/88) Furthermore, in 2007 Israel pre-emptively bombed a suspected nuclear site in Syria in an attempt to thwart Syria's plans to produce their own nuclear weapons.

**IRAN.** Although a signatory and officially a strong supporter of the NPT, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been suspected since 2002 of secretly developing nuclear weapons, thus infringing the provisions of the treaty. Consecutive reports by the Board of Governors of the IAEA expressed the Agency's deep concern regarding possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme. The annex to report GOV/2011/65 of the IAEA contains an in-depth analysis of the issue, proving the high likelihood that Iran is indeed working to create nuclear weapons. Officially, Iran maintains that its nuclear programme is only used for peaceful purposes. However, based on IAEA reports the UN Security

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/proliferation/israel/index.htm>

Council has repeatedly requested that Iran stop its uranium enrichment programme.<sup>2</sup> The UNSC has imposed four rounds of sanctions against the state, targeting primarily but not limited to the supply of nuclear equipment and technology to the state. As the UNSC is considering the possibility of imposing a fresh round of sanctions on Iran, the state has just recently announced that it would move to block the oil route through the Strait of Hormuz if new sanctions are imposed on it.<sup>3</sup>

**SYRIA.** Syria is also suspected of covertly developing nuclear weapons. One such site at Dair Alzour was bombed by Israel in 2007. The discovery of the site greatly alarmed the international community. IAEA experts on the scene have since then concluded that the Dair Alzour facility was most likely an undisclosed nuclear reactor<sup>4</sup>, raising questions about Syria's possible involvement in the development of nuclear weapons. Currently, the IAEA continues to call on Syria to provide more access and information on the Dair Alzour site, as well as on three other suspect locations in the country.<sup>5</sup> The matter has been referred to the UNSC and ties in with discussions on the evolution of the Arab Spring in Syria.

**EGYPT.** Since abandoning its own nuclear programme and adhering fully to the provisions of the NPT, Egypt has been actively striving for the creation of a Nuclear-Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, modeled on similar agreements existing in Africa, Latin America, the South Pacific etc. The matter has been considered during an extensive number of past sessions of the General Assembly, and a consensus on the matter seems to be within reach. (A/RES/66/25)

#### **Main actors:**

Nuclear Weapon States: United States, Russian Federation, UK, France, China, India (non-NPT), Pakistan (non-NPT), North Korea (withdrew from NPT), Israel (believed to have nuclear weapons, non-NPT), Iran (suspected of having a nuclear weapons programme), Syria (suspected of having a nuclear weapons programme).

Have ended their nuclear weapons programmes and are NPT signatories: Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Ukraine.

#### **Policy Options:**

- 1) The creation of a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East, with all parties agreeing to respect the provisions of the NPT and allowing thorough inspections by IAEA representatives;

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10768146>

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16344102>

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-30.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/2011/amsp2011n030.html#syria>

- 2) The reinforcement of NPT and CTBT and negotiations in order to achieve cooperation between regional actors and IAEA officials, without a NWFZ ;
- 3) The creation of a new regional treaty that would address the concerns of all regional actors and would help consolidate the peace process ;
- 4) Brokering an agreement between the states currently not fully cooperating with IAEA inspectors and the Agency so that experts are allowed on site and the safeguards are respected;
- 5) Forwarding a recommendation for further action to the Security Council, aiming at the imposition of sanctions on those actors who refuse to comply with UN and IAEA decisions and do not participate constructively in the debate ;

**Questions to consider:**

- 1) Is your state party to the NPT? If so, has it undertaken any special steps in order to adhere to the treaty (E.g. stopped its nuclear weapons programme)? If not, why does it refuse to sign the treaty?
- 2) Does your state possess any nuclear material (including but not limited to nuclear weapons, technology, etc.)?
- 3) Has your state ever worked on a military nuclear programme?
- 4) Has your state ever made any threats against other states, be they nuclear weapon states or states without any nuclear capabilities? Why was this? What was the result?
- 5) In case your state is a NPT-signatory, has the IAEA ever issued concerns over your state's nuclear programme, the nuclear facilities it runs or the manner in which it interacts with IAEA inspectors?
- 6) What solutions to the current issue has your state supported in the past? In which way would these solutions benefit your state?

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- UNSC Resolutions imposing sanctions against Iran:

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
## **Topic B: The relationship between disarmament and development**

*“In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the **least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources**, we shall be responsible [...] for formulating plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.”* UN Charter, Chapter V, Article 26

Rapid technological change, the end of the Cold War that had kept the world largely bipolar for almost 50 years, and the new people-centered development agenda that has emerged in recent years are some of the factors that have contributed to a redefinition of key concepts. The traditional notion of security is being rapidly replaced by the more holistic concept of **human security**, which goes beyond security against external military threat, incorporating non-military threats to security as well as threats emanating internally from civil conflict and violence. A foremost challenge that confronts us today is the creation of an enabling environment for eradicating the curse of poverty, which afflicts many societies, and achieving sustainable development. International financial institutions, such as the World Bank, have begun to focus greater attention on the devastating consequences of civil conflict on development and the underlying social, economic and political causes of conflict. There is a growing consensus that unless socio-economic progress can be made on a sustainable basis and the fundamental human rights of people are fully recognized, conflict will continue to undermine development prospects.

While new concerns have emerged, some traditional concerns remain valid. The "global arms race" which dominated the disarmament and development debate during the Cold War has ceased to be relevant. Yet, the terror attacks of 9/11 and their consequences have raised new concerns regarding the effects of counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and security-focussed state-building strategies on wider questions of development. Hence, social and economic consequences of military expenditure in developed and developing countries remain a strong cause for concern.

According to data released by the **Stockholm Peace Research Institute**, the global arms expenditure continues to dwarf spending on social sectors that are essential to human wellbeing. Total global military expenditure in 2009 is estimated to have been \$1531 billion. This represents an increase of 6 per cent in real terms compared to 2008, and of 49 per cent since 2000. Military expenditure comprised approximately 2.7 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009.



Map 1.: Military expenditure by GDP 2008

All regions and subregions saw an increase in 2009, except the Middle East<sup>6</sup>. This trend has not changed despite the economic crisis drawing a worrying picture of states increasingly shifting priorities from economic development towards military and security agendas. In many cases, savings on defense and disarmament could make a dramatic difference to human development, while an environment of security would facilitate a lowering of military expenditure<sup>7</sup>.

### **Historical and recent developments**

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010/05>

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/07/armed-forces>

Recognising the urgency of addressing the developmental challenges posed by disproportionately high and continuously rising military expenditure, the member states adopted the first action programme during the Cold War at the **Final Document of the 1987 International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development**. In particular, since the adoption of the **2005 World Summit Outcome** (resolution 60/1), in which world leaders recognized that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing, the importance of this link has become widely accepted. The main existing mechanisms for coordination on these issues within the United Nations are

**(1) The Mine Action Team;**

**(2) The Coordinating Action on Small Arms Mechanism;**

**(3) The Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.**

These bodies aim to ensure that the relationship between disarmament and development is covered in their respective areas through involvement of all relevant actors from within the United Nations system. Furthermore, the **2006 Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development** aims at framing the scope and dimension of the problem of armed violence, developing effective projects and monitoring progress. In recent years, the United Nations has increasingly focused on issues pertaining to the relationship between disarmament and



development. Examples include the broad approach to **the issue of small arms** which the Secretary-General presented to the Security Council in 2008 (S/2008/258), the emphasis on a **comprehensive approach in mine action**, and the support the United Nations is giving to the **2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions**.

Notably a significant number of strategically important states have not committed to the collective arms control and disarmament measures mentioned above, including: the United States, Russia, Israel, Iran, Brazil, Sudan, China, Saudi Arabia, India and Pakistan.

## **Bloc Positions**

**Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)**<sup>8</sup>. The 118 members of the NAM consist mostly of developing countries, including most those classed as Least Developed Countries<sup>9</sup>. Many have experienced or are recently experiencing civil conflict and suffer from state fragility and chronic underdevelopment. There has been a somewhat coordinated effort to move the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development to the center of attention of the UN. In the aftermath on the terror attacks of 9/11 an increasing securitization of aid has resulted in new aid conditionality by donor governments (particularly the US and UK), which demand cooperation in the field of intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism in return for much needed development aid.

**US, Russia, UK, France, Germany, China**<sup>10</sup>. Leading the list of the world's largest arms exporters, these countries depend on foreign markets to boost their strategically important defense industries. The proliferation of arms, especially light weapons, to non-state actors is considered a major threat to stability and security in many fragile states. Additionally, a bloated security and military sector in many developing countries, especially in the Middle East and swallows valuable resources needed for social services, education and infrastructure construction and maintenance crucial for achieving the MDGs in these countries. Hence, the export oriented defense industries of many OECD countries are inherently problematic and contradictory to their vocal advocacy for conflict prevention through sustainable development as well as their large financial contributions to UN and NATO peace-building/state-building efforts.

**Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Libya, Afghanistan, Nepal, Haiti, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Solomon Islands**<sup>11</sup>. The UN Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs in post-conflict states are aimed at contributing to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. The DDR of ex-combatants is a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. It aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem that arises when ex-combatants are left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their former comrades, during the vital transition period from conflict to peace and development. As a key

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<sup>8</sup> <http://www.namegypt.org/en/AboutName/MembersObserversAndGuests/Pages/default.aspx>

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.unohrlls.org/>

<sup>10</sup> <http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/toplist.php>

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php>

part of comprehensive peace- and state-building efforts, the needs and demands of each post conflict state vary strongly and need to be addressed with reference to specific UN agencies.

**Policy Options:**

- 1) The creation of a legally binding instrument:
  - a) for reducing the diversion for Armaments of their State's human and economic resources
  - b) to establish and maintain systems that enable annual independent verification and auditing of their States compliance;
  - c) to establish a United Nations mechanism to facilitate implementation; dealing with such matters as non-compliance, concessions, reporting and auditing standards, and the publication of targets and achievements annually;
  - d) that specifies how amounts diverted from Armaments are to be used on State and UN programmes such as poverty reduction, sustainable development, conflict prevention, peaceful resolution of conflict, protecting the vulnerable, maintaining the environment; and effective and efficient implementation of the legally binding Instrument;
  - e) that gives full opportunities to non-governmental organisations and other non-state actors to make their contributions in implementation, compliance and allocation of resources;
  - f) that requires review and re-commitment by the States to the legally binding Instrument after a period of between 10 and 25 years
- 2) The reinforcement of:
  - a) The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions
  - b) the 1999 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty),
  - c) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

- 3) Commitment to the 0,7% UN Millennium Project Target<sup>12</sup>
- 4) Commitment to reallocation of resources to United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programs

**Questions to consider:**

- 1) How does your state perform on the Human Development Index<sup>13</sup>? What is your state's military spending relative to GDP? How does this figure compare to spending on social welfare?
- 2) Has your state recently experienced/engaged in armed conflict (civil war, foreign intervention, etc.)? Has there been a DDR program?
- 3) Does your state give or receive development aid? Is this aid channeled through UN bodies and agencies? If not, what proportion of this aid is civilian/military?
- 4) Is your state in support of the collective arms control and disarmament initiatives mentioned above? If not, why?
- 5) In how far has your state succeeded/failed to achieve the UN Millennium Development Goals<sup>14</sup> (in particular goal 1: eradicating extreme poverty and hunger).

**Recommended Reading:**

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development (2009). Retrieved January 2, 2012, from:  
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<sup>12</sup> <http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/press/07.htm>

<sup>13</sup> <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/map/>

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml>

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United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Country Programmes:

- a) Sierra Leone: <http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=60>
- b) Afghanistan: <http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=121>
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